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THE UTAH GovERNMENTAL I MMUNITY AcT: WHoM
DoEs IT REALLY PROTECT?
McCLAIN NAPIER*

tah, like most states, seeks to protect its government
employees from frivolous civil suits that may arise
through "the performance of the employee's duties."1
In its opening, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
states that, " . .. each governmental entity and each employee of
a governmental entity are immune from suit for any injury that
results from the exercise of a governmental function." 2 With this
sweeping statement of immunity, the question arises, where does
Utah draw the line in protecting its employees? Is there any instance when a government agent may be held liable for committing
negligent actions while on duty?
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act is not as all-encompassing in protecting government employees as implied in the act's absolutist opening. In fact, Utah courts in recent cases have more liberally denied immunity to government agents for actions performed
on duty. The article will show how Utah has embraced this trend
through an analysis of the evolution of the immunity act and through
a review of significant cases under the current version. Furthermore,
to better understand how current immunity code may sway future
rulings, the article will apply the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
to a developing case involving the limits of a peace officer's discretionary function.
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Utah's governmental immunity policy has changed frequently,
especially during the past century. "Prior to 1965, the [Utah] government enjoyed immunity from all damages claims."3 Utah courts
granted immunity waivers on only a few occasions. These occasions
typically involved the just compensation for the public use or damage of private property or the private endeavors of municipal corporations.4 The only other option for a citizen seeking recovery came
through petitioning the state legislature to alter immunity pol icy. 5 Essentially, the state of Utah could not " be sued without its consent.'>6
Utah's immunity policy evolved gradually due to the myriad of
modifications enacted by the Utah legislature? However, Utah courts
often opposed these changes. This opposition came to a head in
Laney v. Fairview City when the Utah Supreme Court ruled the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act to be unconstitutional. 8 In Laney, the
plaintiff sought recovery from the defendant for the wrongful death
of her husband who died from electrocution when irrigation pipes
that he carried touched power lines. Laney claimed that the lines
were hung negligently low. 9 The city moved for summary judgment,
claiming immunity since the maintenance of power lines met the
criteria for discretionary function according to previous Utah code,
§ 63-30-10. 10 The district court granted the city's motion, finding that
3

Adam Goldstein, Recent Legislation: IV. Tort Law: A. Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 380, 380 (2005).

4

David West, Tort Claims Against the State of Utah. 5
235-36 (1957).

5

!d. at 241.

6

!d. at 245.

7

Goldstein, supra note 3, at 381.

8

Laney v. Fairview City, 57 P.3d I 007, I027 (Utah 2002).

9

!d. at lOll.

10

!d.
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the height and condition of power lines did pertain to discretionary
function." The appellate court upheld the judgment.
The Supreme Court agreed that the maintenance of power lines
was a matter of discretionary function according to Utah code, but
they determined that the code violated the Open Courts Clause of the
Utah Constitution. 12 Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's summary judgment and remanded for a new trial.U
With the previous code deemed unconstitutional, the Utah Legislature set out to revise the policy on governmental immunity, ultimately leading to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act of 2004.
This version removed the practice of granting immunity to actions
that only the government could perform14 and it set a monetary cap
on how much an individual could recover against the state.15

II.

J UDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CURRENT IMMUNITY ACT

The developments following Laney indicated the state's willingness to avoid total sovereign immunity, or the idea that the "king can
do no wrong."16 Utah has not completely abandoned immunity for its
government agents,17 but trends show that Utah courts have become
more accepting of state liability in civil suits.
The evolution of this trend is clearly seen before Laney. For
instance, in Day v. State the plaintiff sought recovery for the death
of her husband, claiming that the officer who had engaged a suspect
II

/d.

12

Utah Const. art. I, §II; Laney, 57 P.3d at I 027.

13

Laney, 57 P.3d at 1027.

14

Goldstein, supra note 3, at 383.

15

!d. at 384.

16

West, supra note 4, at 233.

17

See also Peck v. State ofUtah, 191 P.3d 4 (Utah 2008); see also Oliver v.
Woods, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (D. Utah 1998); see also Tiede v. State of Utah,
9 15 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996).
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in a high-speed pursuit was liable for the consequential crash that
took her husband's life. 18 Although the state argued for immunity,
the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff saying that the officer owed a specific duty of care to any potential victims during the
high-speed chase. 19
The Court examined Utah's Public Duty Doctrine and explained
how Ms. Day's situation created a special relationship of due care
between her husband and the police officer. The Court stated, "Although a government entity owes a general duty to all members of
the public, that duty does not impose a specific duty of due care on
the government with respect to individuals who may be harmed by
governmental action or inaction."20
The Court then explained the few exceptions to the Public Duty
Doctrine that create a specific duty between agent and civilian. They
said:
At least four circumstances may give rise to a special relationship between the government and specific individuals. A special relationship can be established {1) by a statute intended to protect a specific class of persons of which
the plaintiff is a member from a particular type of harm;
(2) when a government agent undertakes specific action to
protect a person or property; (3) by government actions that
reasonably induce detrimental reliance by a member of the
public; and (4) under circumstances when the agency has actual custody of the plaintiff or of a third person who causes
harm to the plaintiff. 21
This policy of a special duty of care between an agent and an
injured party was upheld more recently in the case of Tindley v. Salt
18

Day v. State, 980 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1999).

19

!d. at 1181.

20

!d. at 1175.

21

!d.
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Lake City School District. 22 In Tindley, the families of several high
school students who were injured and killed sought recovery from
the city for an accident caused by the negligent driving of a debate
coach as the team returned from competition.23 The city conceded its
negligence without contest. Although Tind/ey dealt primarily with
the constitutionality of a recovery cap,24 it provides yet another example of a governmental entity recognizing its liability regardless of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 25
This same post-Laney challenge to immunity is seen again in
Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrof.26 Similar to Day, this case questioned the liability of an officer for a fatality caused during vehicular
pursuit. Tragically, the fatality was that of a young boy killed on his
bicycle by the officer's vehicle. 27 The lower courts previous to Kouris
granted the state's motion for summary judgment. They found that
the defendant was immune from any claim of negligence under the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act since the operation of his emergency vehicle was a governmental function. 28 The Utah Supreme
Court, however, found that the trial court had hastily granted immunity to the defendant as it had yet to be determined if the officer had
properly used his emergency lights according to Utah code.29 The
Court remanded the case for trial ruling that if the officer had violated Utah code by not properly operating his emergency lights, the
state would lose its immunity.30 Thus, Kouris stands as yet another
22

Tindley v. Salt Lake City School District, 116 P.3d 295 (Utah 2005).

23

/d. at 297.

24

The cap on recovery for aggregate damages in Utah is $500,000 (Tind/ey,
116 P.3d at 298).

25

See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000); see also Parks v. Utah Transit
Authority, 53 P.3d 473 (Utah 2002).

26

Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d 72 (Utah 2005).

27

/d. at 74.

28

/d. at 75.

29

/d. at77.

30

!d.
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post-Laney example of the Utah Court refusing to grant immunity to
a government agency.
Ill. AN

EXPLORATION OF THE CURRENT IMMUNITY AcT THROUGH A
D EVELOPING CASE

In light of these recent cases and the apparent trend of the Utah
Supreme Court toward leniency in waiving immunity, the goal of
the article is to now predict how this trend might sway future rulings in negligence claims against the state. The article will apply
current immunity code and recent cases relevant to the Immunity
Act to a unique case that has not yet come before a cour t. 31 Through
this application, one will see how the latest evolutions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act make it very likely that immunity will
be waived not only in this developing case, but in other future cases where the limits of a peace officer's discretionary function are
called into question. The section will proceed by stating the facts of
the case, examining applicable law, and by drawing conclusions for
the case given the examined law. The purpose of this section is not
to show whether the officer in question is guilty of negligence, but
whether be would receive immunity.
A. THE CASE

The case involves an underage teenager who, while driving illegally, got into a car accident that left her terribly disfigured. Before
the accident, she was stopped by an officer who knew her and knew
she was underage. The girl pled with the officer to let her go since
she was only out to get gas for the car and since she was so close to
her home. The officer, persuaded by her pleas, gave her a warning
and told her to go straight borne.
31

Since this case has not yet had its day in court, the names of the involved
parties and the location of the incident are withheld. Furthermore, due to
the case's early stage of development in the legal system, a proper citation
for the details of the case cannot yet be given. Therefore, the reader may
regard the case as hypothetical.
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However, the officer did not accompany the girl to her house and
the girl did not go home. She continued driving with her friends in
the car, and was eventually involved in a traffic accident. Because of
the high cost of the medical and insurance bills, the minor and her
family now seek recovery from the city. The girl claims that the officer had it in his power and in his duty to prevent her from driving
that day, and that the officer's failure to do so was a breach of his
duty.
B. APPLICABLE LAW CONCERNING THE O FFICER's IMMUNITY

One might conclude that the officer is immune from liability
since it was the girl's decision to drive illegally despite the officer's
warning to go straight home. However, to determine a government
agent's liability for actions performed while on duty, one must determine if those actions constitute discretionary function, as was central in Laney. Utah Code states:
(4) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is
waived as to any injury proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of an employee committed within the scope
of employment. (5) Immunity from suit of each government
entity is not waived... if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from (a) the exercise or performance, or
the failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary function,
whether or not the discretion is abused. 32
Therefore, if the actions constitute the agent's discretionary function, then that agent is immune from liability. If not, then the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act does not protect the agent.
1. DEFINING DISCRETIONARY F UNCTION

At first glance, the officer's actions may appear to be discretionary. For instance, an officer is typically not required to issue a ticket
32

U TAH CooEANN.

§ 630-7-301 (2008).
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every time he stops a speeder. He is given discretion in the matter.
Would not the same hold true for the officer in question? Answering
this question requires looking to Utah courts for the definition of
discretionary function. The Court defines discretionary function as
an act that (1) involves a basic governmental policy or objective; (2)
must be essential to the realization or accomplishment of the policy
or objective; (3) must involve judgment; and (4) is performed by a
governmental entity with the proper authority. 33
Determining whether the officer's actions were discretionary
hinges on whether his decisions were essential to the realization or
accomplishment of a basic governmental policy or objective. State v.
Harmon sheds further light on governmental objectives as they apply to the case at hand. 34 The defendant, who was being charged with
possession of narcotics, argued that her initial arrest after a traffic
stop, based solely on the fact that her driver's license had been recently suspended, was unmerited. The court ruled against the defendant saying that in light of the "governmental interest in removing
unlicensed drivers from the road for public safety reasons" the officer in question had the reasonable duty to apprehend the unlicensed
driver. They continued, "Her offense of driving on suspension is different from, for example, speeding, because allowing her to 'proceed
on her way' without a valid license permits the continuation of her
unlawful activity." 3s
Furthermore, Utah Code states that "a person may not authorize
or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by him or under his
control to be driven by a person in violation of this chapter" (i.e. an
unlicensed driver). 36 Thus, according to Harmon and the above-cited
statute, an officer has the duty to prevent a person from driving if
that person is unlicensed. To do otherwise would permit the continuation of an unlawful activity and would break a basic government
objective (i.e. "removing unlicensed drivers from the road").37
33

Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1983).

34

State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995).

35

!d. at 1203-1204.

36

UTAH CODEA NN. § 53-3-203(1) (2008).

37

See Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1203-04.
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2. THE Pusuc DUTY DocTRINE
Finally, to determine whether the officer in question may be held
liable at all, it must be shown whether the officer had a specific duty
of care to the injured party. The Public Duty Doctrine, as explained
in Day, states that although a peace officer owes a general duty to all
members of the public "that duty docs not impose a specific duty of
due care on the government with respect to individuals who may be
harmed by governmental action or inaction."38 As previously mentioned, Day states that "a special relationship can be established (1)
by a statute intended to protect a specific class of persons of which
the plaintiff is a member from a particular type of harm; (2) when a
government agent undertakes specific action to protect a person or
property. . . ." 39

C.

CONCLUSIONS FOR THE CASE AT HAND

Therefore, it is essential to answer two questions in determining
whether the officer may be held liable under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. First, does the officer's action in allowing the girl to
continue driving the day of the accident meet the criteria for discretionary function? And second, did he have a specific duty of care to
the girl?
The answer to the first question must only be no; allowing the
girl to continue driving did not constitute a discretionary function.
Based on Utah Code, a government entity's decision must necessarily involve and be essential to the realization of a basic governmental policy or objective in order to be considered a discretionary
function. 40 The officer's decision to Jet the girl drive away furthered
no government objective. In fact, considering Utah's push to "keep
unlicensed drivers off the road," the officer acted contrary to Utah's
policy objectives.41 Furthermore, by allowing the girl to continue
38

Day, 980 P.2d at 1175.

39

!d.

40

UTAH CODEANN.§ 63G-7-30! (2008).

41

See Harmon, 91 0 P.2d at 1196.
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driving, the officer failed to protect a group of minors from a dangerous situation and be violated Utah code since he essentially condoned the continuation of the plaintiff's illegal driving when he had
sufficient control over the vehicle to prevent the action. 42
In light of these Utah policy objectives, the decision to stop the
plaintiff from driving left the realm of discretionary function and
entered that of ministerial function, where the officer had no choice
of his own in the matter. 43 Therefore, since the officer's actions do
not meet the criteria of discretionary function, the officer would be
ineligible for immunity.
Concerning the second question, the answer must be yes; the
officer had a specific duty of care to the girl due to the special relationship between the two parties. As described in Day,44 the criteria
to establish a special relationship in exception to the Public Duty
Doctrine are, first, does the plaintiff pertain to a specific class of
persons? Yes, she is a minor. Second, are there statutes in Utah that
protect such minors? There are numerous statutes, namely statutory
rape laws, anti-predatory laws, and drinking and smoking restrictions. More applicably, however, there are laws in Utah that prohibit
minors from driving until a certain age and only after sufficient
training and certification.45 Clearly, the plaintiffbelongs to a specific
class of persons protected by Utah statute.
Second, a special relationship must be shown to have been established between the defendant and the plaintiff through the specific
actions taken by the officer to protect the plaintiff. The moment that
the officer pulled the girl to the side of the road with the intent of
halting any further reckless driving-the moment that he issued her
a warning and told her to go straight home-that relationship was
established with its accompanying duty of due care.
42

U TAH

CODE ANN. § 53-3-203 {2008).

43

See Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977) discussing the

difference between discretionary function and ministerial function as the
former being an open decision left to the officer, which receives immunity,
and the latter being an order, which is exempt from immunity.
44

Day, 980 P.2d at 1175.

45

UTAH CODE

ANN. § 41-8-1 (2008).
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Therefore, given the current version of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act and tbe current trend of Utah courts to more liberally
waive immunity for government agents, it is clear that the state in
this case would not receive immunity. Whether the officer's actions
were actually negligent, however, is an entirely different matter.

IV. CoNCLUSION
What does this mean for the future of litigation in Utah? Will
the current trend of diminished immunity lead to incessant frivolous
legal suits against the state? Indeed. long gone are the days when the
state enjoyed near total immunity. But, it would be an unfounded
prediction to say the other extreme is forthcoming, and hopefully
such a prediction would never come true. As has been shown, there
have been several cases showing Utah's willingness to waive immunity, but there are still those few strong cases, post-Laney, where
the Court has maintained immunity. And that is the way it should
be. Utah has reached the happy medium in governmental immunity.
Although the Utah Governmental Immunity Acts opens on an absolutist line, that governmental entities "are immune from suit for any
injury that results from the exercise of a governmental function,'"' 6
Utah courts have clearly arrived at the reasonable exceptions to the
rule.

46

U TAH C ODE ANN.§

630-7-201( 1) (2008).

